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In  determining  the  net benefits  attrib-
utable  to  the  continued  availability  of  a
unique natural environment, it is standard
practice  to  subtract  maintenance  or  op-
erating  cost from an estimate  of aggegate
benefits.  Site benefits, in turn, are derived
typically from the  use of some variant  of
contingent  valuation  or travel-cost  meth-
odologies.  In this analytic framework, users
of the  site can  affect  the  efficiency  eval-
uation of its continued availability  by their
willingness  to  forego  income  (in the  case
of compensating  variation)  to  insure sup-
ply.  The introduction  of time-constrained
utility  maximization  into the analysis pre-
sents  an  interesting  extension  of  this
framework;  namely,  it  allows  users  to
guarantee  supply  either  by  foregoing  in-
come  or by  foregoing  leisure or  by  some
combination  of the two.  This  extension  is
interesting  from  both  an  efficiency  and
distributive  equity point  of  view.  On the
efficiency  side,  the  introduction  of  lei-
sure-time  payments  tends  to  increase  es-
timates for aggregate  site benefits.  On the
distributive  equity  side,  benefit estimates
based  on income-time  endowments  may
have  considerable  "fairness"  advantages
over  estimates  based  on  income  endow-
ments alone.
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An Illustration
Suppose  a  utility-maximizing  individ-
ual is  allowed  use of  a unique  recreation
area  either by  paying  for site  services  or
by  agreeing  to do  maintenance  work  on
the  site.  If the  area  were  unavailable  to
the user,  utility would  be U° where
U°  =  U(Y, T,  P,  t,  0) (1)
and
Y  =  income;
T  =  leisure time;
P  =  a vector  of relative  prices;
t  =  a  vector  of time prices;
and 0  indicates the  site  is unavailable  for
use.  A  rational  individual  would  be  un-
willing to contract for any income-leisure
time  payment  which  would  result  in  a
level of  utility less  than U°.  One  contract
consistent  with  this  condition  might  be
called  the money  compensating variation
payment  (Cy):
, =  (AYo,  0)
where
U(Y  - AYo,  T, P,  t,  1) =  U°
(2)
and 1 indicates the site is available for use.
In  this  case,  site  supply  is  being  insured
through  foregone  income  only.  A second
special case might be called the time com-
pensating  variation payment  (CT)  defined
as
CT  =  (0, ATo) (3)
where
U(Y,  T-  AT0, P,  t,  1) = U°.
Here  site supply  is being insured through
foregone leisure only.  More generally,  (2)
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and  (3)  belong  to  a  locus  of
sure  time  payments  for  whiz
would  voluntarily  contract  to
ply. This relationship  is the wi
pay  locus  or  contract  curve  c
all  (AY,  AT)  combinations  re
level  of utility  U°:
U°= U(Y  - AY,  T - AT,  P
Along the contract  curve, an  i
indifferent  between  making
income-leisure  time  payment
guaranteed  access  to  the  re,
making  no  payments  and  be
access.
The  valuation  question  nc
one  of  identifying  the  (AY,
nation  along  (4)  which  corre
user  benefits.  By  total  differ
(4), the slope  of the contract
dAY  -aU/OAT
dAT  d=U/OAY
If  marginal utility  is diminish
spect to both income and leisum
the  willingness-to-pay  locus
curve is concave to the origin
in Figure 1. The  individual's
uation  of leisure  time  is  refl(
steepness  of the contract  curv
the marginal  rate of substitut
leisure time  and income.
Given  (AY,  AT)  payments
in  a  level  of  utility  U°  for  tl
payment  combination  which  maximizes
the contribution to site net benefits is found
by solving the following:
MAX p  = AY  + oAT
(AY,  AT)
s.t. U  = U
o (6)
where  w  is  the  market-determined  wage
rate  for  site  maintenance  work.  That  is,
by agreeing  to a  (AY,  AT) contract, aggre-
curve  gate  benefits  are  increased  by  AY  while
AT  maintenance  costs are reduced by wAT.  A
necessary condition  for solving  (6)  is  that
yments  and  the slope of the  contract  curve  (5)  equals
the wage rate. This is illustrated in Figure
1 at point  A,  corresponding  to payments
income-lei-  of  AY* and AT* and  a benefit measure  of
ch  the  user  p*  = AY*  +  wAT*  attributable to the user.
insure  sup-
llingness-to-
onsisting  of  Efficiency  Implications
suiting  in  a  As  correctly  pointed  out  by  Bockstael
and  Strand,  money  compensating  varia-
,t,  1)  (4)  tion and time compensating variation  are
not necessarily  equal. In fact, Cy c  CT de-
ndividual  is  pending  on  the  shape  of  the  user's  con-
any  pair  of  tract  curve  (i.e.,  depending  on  the  mar-
s and  being  ginal rate of substitution  between  income
source,  and  and  leisure)  and  on  the  market-deter-
eing  denied  mined  wage  rate  for  maintenance  ser-
vices.  More  fundamentally,  as  illustrated
Aw  becomes  in this simple  model, neither  Cy nor  CT  is
AT)  combi-  necessarily the correct welfare measure of
ctly  reflects  user  benefits.  Compensating  variation  is
entiation  of  uniquely  determined  by  payments  AY*
curve is:  and AT*. This corresponds  to user benefits
of  p*  which  is  larger  than  either  AYo  or
(5)  coATo.  By restricting  payments  to  income
or time only, constrained estimates  of user
ing with re-  benefits  will  be  underestimated  by  (p*  -
re time, then  AYo)/p*  or  (p*  - wATo)/p*  respectively.'
or  contract
as illustrated
relative  val-  Equity Implications relative  val-
ected  in  the  It is commonplace  to present  efficiency
e, that is, in  recommendations  with  qualifications
ion between
'This  result  is analogous  to option  value  arguments
which result  advanced  by  Graham,  Freeman,  and  others  con-
he  user,  the  cerning  benefit  estimation under uncertainty.
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Figure  2.  Income-Time  Endowments  and
the Valuation  of  User Benefits.
based  on  distributive  equity  consider-
ations.  Since benefit estimates  are depen-
dent  upon  existing  income  endowments,
which may  or  may  not be equitable,  ad-
vocating  a  resource  policy  solely  on  the
basis that it constitutes  a potential  Pareto
improvement  cannot insure that an actual
increase in social welfare will occur.  While
extending  benefit  estimation  to  allow  for
both  income  and  leisure-time  payments
cannot eliminate equity reservations,  ben-
efit  estimates  based  on  income-time  en-
dowments  may  have  significant  equity
advantages  over  those based solely  on  in-
come endowments.
Consider  Figure 2.  Contract  curves for
two site  users are illustrated  by WTP1 and
WTP2. Comparing  WTP 1 and WTP2, the
former may reflect payments agreeable  to
a "busy executive"  or "yuppie profession-
al" who values time highly and has a high
level  of income,  while the latter might be
associated  with  a  "struggling  graduate
student"  or  a  "retiree  on  fixed  income"
who  has  more  leisure  time  but restricted
income.  Despite  differing  marginal  rates
of  substitution  between  leisure  and  in-
come,  as  well  as  differing  income-time
endowments,  the compensating  variation
measure  of  user  benefits  is  identical  for
the two users.  In the absence  of an oppor-
tunity to contribute labor to insure supply,
willingness-to-pay  in  terms  of  income
would  have  been  AY'  for  user  one  and
AY2  <  AY'  for  user  two.  The  extended
analysis  illustrates  that  the  two  users  ac-
tually "value" the site equally once supply
can be insured with combinations of fore-
gone leisure and income.  Additionally, by
restricting payments to income, aggregate
benefits attributable to the two users would
be underestimated  by 2Y  - (AVY  +  AY2).
The use of time compensating variation
estimates  of  benefits  would  suggest  that
type two users value the site more highly
(i.e.,  AT2  >  AT') while  money  compen-
sating  variation  measures  would  suggest
just  the opposite.  These  contradictory  re-
sults illustrate  the  sensitivity  of  valuation
procedures  to  the  implicit  judgments
which  are  made  with  respect  to  an  ac-
ceptable  endowment base.  While  there is
no indeterminancy  encountered  in  iden-
tifying a unique measure of compensating
variation  given  endowment  assumptions,
considerable  ambiguity  exists in  selecting
an equitable  base.2 While  the  model  de-
veloped  here  is  much  too  oversimplified
to  make any definitive statements, it does
suggest that allowing users to express their
valuation  of a recreation  site through both
income  and  leisure-time  payments  may
result  in  more  realistic  and  equitable  es-
timates for site benefits. Unfortunately the
applicability  of  such  a  procedure  may
prove limited since real-world possibilities
for contracting  for leisure-time payments
may be  severely restricted.
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